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Abstract
The efficient use of limited computational re-
sources is an essential ingredient of intel-
ligence. Selecting computations optimally
according to rational metareasoning would
achieve this, but this is computationally in-
tractable. Inspired by psychology and neu-
roscience, we propose the first concrete and
domain-general learning algorithm for approx-
imating the optimal selection of computations:
Bayesian metalevel policy search (BMPS). We
derive this general, sample-efficient search al-
gorithm for a computation-selecting metalevel
policy based on the insight that the value of
information lies between the myopic value
of information and the value of perfect in-
formation. We evaluate BMPS on three in-
creasingly difficult metareasoning problems:
when to terminate computation, how to allo-
cate computation between competing options,
and planning. Across all three domains, BMPS
achieved near-optimal performance and com-
pared favorably to previously proposed metar-
easoning heuristics. Finally, we demonstrate
the practical utility of BMPS in an emergency
management scenario, even accounting for the
overhead of metareasoning.
1 INTRODUCTION
The human brain is the best example of an intelligent
system we have so far. One feature that sets it apart from
current AI is the remarkable computational efficiency
that enables people to effortlessly solve hard problems
for which artificial intelligence either under-performs
humans or requires superhuman computing power and
training time. For instance, to defeat Garry Kasparov
3.5–2.5, Deep Blue had to evaluate 200 000 000 posi-
tions per second, whereas Kasparov was able to per-
form at almost the same level by evaluating only 3 posi-
tions per second (Campbell, Hoane, & Hsu, 2002; IBM
Research, 1997). This ability to make efficient use of
limited computational resources is the essence of intel-
ligence (Russell & Wefald, 1991a). People accomplish
this feat by being very selective about when to think and
what to think about, choosing computations adaptively
and terminating deliberation when its expected benefit
falls below its cost (Gershman, Horvitz, & Tenenbaum,
2015; Lieder & Griffiths, 2017; Payne, Bettman, & John-
son, 1988).
Rational metareasoning was introduced to recreate
such intelligent control over computation in machines
(Horvitz, Cooper, & Heckerman, 1989; Russell & We-
fald, 1991b; Hay, Russell, Tolpin, & Shimony, 2012).
In principle, rational metareasoning can be used to al-
ways select those computations that make optimal use
of the agent’s finite computational resources. However,
its computational complexity is prohibitive (Hay et al.,
2012). The human mind circumvents this computational
challenge by learning to select computations through
metacognitive reinforcement learning (Krueger, Lieder,
& Griffiths, 2017; Lieder & Griffiths, 2017; Wang et al.,
2017). Concretely, people appear to learn to predict the
value of alternative cognitive operations from features
of the task, their current belief state, and the cognitive
operations themselves. If humans learn to metareason
through metacognitive reinforcement learning, then it
should be possible to build intelligent systems that learn
to metareason as efficiently as people.
In this paper, we introduce Bayesian metalevel policy
search (BMPS), the first domain-general algorithm for
learning how to metareason, and evaluate it against exist-
ing methods for approximate metareasoning on three in-
creasingly more complex toy problems. Finally, we show
that our method makes metareasoning efficient enough to
offset its cost in a more realistic emergency management
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scenario. In this problem, which we use as a running ex-
ample, an emergency manager must decide which cities
to evacuate in the face of an approaching tornado. She
bases her decision on a series of computationally inten-
sive simulations that noisily estimate the impact of the
tornado on each city. Because time is short, she is forced
to decide which simulations are the most important to
run. In the following section, we discuss how to formal-
ize this problem as a sequential decision process.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 METAREASONING
If reasoning seeks an answer to the question “what
should I do?”, metareasoning seeks to answer the ques-
tion “how should I decide what to do?”. The theory of ra-
tional metareasoning (Russell & Wefald, 1991b; Russell
& Subramanian, 1995) frames this problem as selecting
computations so as to maximize the sum of the rewards
of resulting decisions minus the costs of the computa-
tions involved. Concretely, one can formalize reason-
ing as a metalevel Markov decision process (metalevel
MDP) and metareasoning as solving that MDP (Hay et
al., 2012). While traditional (object-level) MDPs de-
scribe the objects of reasoning—the state of the external
environment and how it is affected by physical actions—
a metalevel MDP describes reasoning itself. Formally, a
metalevel MDP Mmeta = (B,A, Tmeta, rmeta) is an MDP
where the states B encode the agent’s beliefs, the ac-
tions A are computations, the transition function Tmeta
describes how computations update beliefs, and the re-
ward function rmeta describes the costs and benefits of
computation. A definition table for our notation is in-
cluded in the Supplementary Material.
A belief state b ∈ B encodes a probability distribution
over parameters θ of a model of the domain. For ex-
ample, in the tornado problem described in the introduc-
tion, θ could be a vector of k probabilities that each of
the k cities will incur evacuation-warranting damage; b
would thus encode k distributions over [0, 1], e.g. k Beta
distributions. The parameters θ determine the utility of
acting according to a policy pi, that is Upi(θ). For one-
shot decisions, Upi(θ) is the expected reward of taking
the single action identified with pi. In the tornado prob-
lem, for example, pi can be represented as a binary vector
of length k indicating whether each city should be evac-
uated, and Upi(θ) is the cost of making the evacuations
plus the expected cost of failing to evacuate cities that
incur major damage. In sequential decision-problems,
Upi(θ) = V
(θ)
pi (s) is the expected sum of rewards the
agent will obtain by acting according to policy pi if the
environment has the characteristics encoded by θ.
A includes computations C that update the belief, as well
as a special metalevel action ⊥ that terminates delibera-
tion and initiates acting on the current belief. The effects
of computations are encoded by Tmeta : B × A × B →
[0, 1] analogously to a standard transition function. The
termination action always leads to a unique end state.
The metalevel reward function rmeta captures the cost
of thinking (Shugan, 1980) and the external reward the
agent expects to receive from the environment. The com-
putations C have no external effects and thus always in-
cur a negative reward rmeta(b, c) = −cost(c). In the
problems studied below, all computations that deliber-
ate have the same cost, that is cost(c) = λ for all c ∈ C
whereas cost(⊥) = 0. An external reward is received
only when the agent terminates deliberation and makes a
decision, which is assumed to be optimal given the cur-
rent belief. The metalevel reward for terminating is thus
rmeta(b,⊥) = maxpi Eθ∼b[Upi(θ)].1
Early work on rational metareasoning (Russell & We-
fald, 1991b) defined the optimal way to select computa-
tions as maximizing the value of computation (VOC):
pi∗meta = argmax
c
VOC(c, b), (1)
where VOC(c, b) is the expected improvement in deci-
sion quality that can be achieved by performing compu-
tation c in belief state b and continuing optimally, mi-
nus the cost of the optimal sequence of computations
(Russell & Wefald, 1991b). When no computation has
positive value, the policy terminates computation and ex-
ecutes the best object-level action, thus VOC(⊥, b) = 0.
2.2 APPROXIMATE METAREASONING
Previous work (Russell & Wefald, 1991b; Lin,
Kolobov, Kamar, & Horvitz, 2015) has approx-
imated rational metareasoning by the meta-greedy
policy argmaxc VOC1(c, b) where VOC1(c, b) =
EB′∼Tmeta(b,c,·) [rmeta(B
′,⊥)]− rmeta(b,⊥)+ rmeta(b, c),
is the myopic value of computation (Russell & Wefald,
1991b). The meta-greedy policy selects each computa-
tion assuming that it will be the last computation. This
policy is optimal when computation provides diminish-
ing returns (i.e. the improvement from each additional
computation is less than that from the previous one), but
it deliberates too little when this assumption is violated.
For example, in the tornado problem (where false nega-
tives have high cost), a single simulation may be unable
to ensure that evacuation is unnecessary with sufficient
confidence, while two or more could.
1If the agent’s model is unbiased, this reward has the same
expectation but lower variance than the true external reward.
Hay et al. (2012) approximated rational metareasoning
by combining the solutions to smaller metalevel MDPs
that formalize the problem of deciding how to decide
between one object-level action and the expected re-
turn of its best alternative. Each of these smaller met-
alevel MDPs includes only the computations for rea-
soning about the expected return of the corresponding
object-level action. While this blinkered approximation
is more accurate than the meta-greedy policy, it is also
significantly less scalable and not directly applicable to
metareasoning about planning.
These are the main approximations to rational metarea-
soning. So, to date, there appears to be no accurate and
scalable method for solving general metalevel MDPs.
2.3 METACOGNITIVE RL
It has been proposed that metareasoning can be made
tractable by learning an approximation to the value of
computation (Russell & Wefald, 1991b). However, de-
spite some preliminary steps in this direction (Harada
& Russell, 1998; Lieder et al., 2014; Lieder, Krueger,
& Griffiths, 2017) and related work on meta-learning
(Smith-Miles, 2009; Thornton, Hutter, Hoos, & Leyton-
Brown, 2013; Wang et al., 2017), learning to approx-
imate bounded optimal information processing remains
an unsolved problem in artificial intelligence.
Previous research in cognitive science suggests that peo-
ple circumvent the intractability of metareasoning by
learning a metalevel policy from experience (Lieder &
Griffiths, 2017; Cushman & Morris, 2015; Krueger et al.,
2017). At least in some cases, the underlying mechanism
appears to be model-free reinforcement learning (RL)
(Cushman & Morris, 2015; Krueger et al., 2017). This
suggests that model-free reinforcement learning might
be a promising approach to solving metalevel MDPs.
To our knowledge, this approach is yet to be explored
in artificial intelligence. Here, we present a proof-
of-concept that near-optimal metalevel policies can be
learned through metacognitive reinforcement learning.
3 BAYESIAN METALEVEL POLICY
SEARCH
According to rational metareasoning, an optimal met-
alevel policy is one that maximizes the VOC (Equa-
tion 1). Although the VOC is intractable to compute, it
can bounded. Bayesian metalevel policy search (BMPS)
capitalizes on these bounds to dramatically reduce the
difficulty of learning near-optimal metalevel policies.
Figure 1 illustrates that if the expected decision quality
improves monotonically with the number of computa-
tions, then the improvement achieved by the optimal se-
quence of computations should lie between the benefit of
deciding immediately after the first computation and the
benefit of obtaining perfect information (Howard, 1966).
The former is given by the myopic value of information,2
(2)VOI1(c, b) = EB′∼Tmeta(b,c,·) [U (B
′)]− U (b) .
and the latter is given by the value of perfect information,
(3)VPI(b) = Eθ∗∼b [U (B∗ (·; θ∗))]− U (b) ,
where U(b) = rmeta(b,⊥) is shorthand for the expected
value of terminating computation and B∗(θ; θ∗) =
δ(θi − θ∗i ) is the belief state with perfect knowledge of
the true environment parameters θ∗.
In problems with many parameters, this upper bound can
be very loose because the optimal metalevel policy might
reason only about a small subset of relevant parame-
ters. To capture this, we introduce an additional fea-
ture VPIsub(c, b) that measures how beneficial it would
be to have full information about a subset of the parame-
ters that are most relevant to the given computation. We
model relevance with a function f(c, i) that returns 1 if
θi is relevant to what c is reasoning about and 0 other-
wise. Using this relevance function, we define the value
of gaining perfect information about the relevant subset
of parameters as
(4)VPIsub(c, b) = Eθ∗∼b [U(B′sub(·; c, b, θ∗))]− U(b),
2The VOI1 defined here is equal to the myopic VOC defined
by Russell and Wefald (1991) plus the cost of the computation.
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Figure 1: Expected performance in metareasoning about
how to choose between three actions increases monoton-
ically with the number of computations, asymptoting at
the value of perfect information (VPI). Consequently, the
value of executing a single computation must lie between
the myopic value of information (VOI1) and the VPI.
with
B′sub(θ; c, b, θ
∗) =
k∏
i
B∗(θi; θ∗)f(c,i) · b(θi)1−f(c,i),
where k is the number of parameters in the agent’s
model of the environment. In the tornado problem, for
example, each simulation is informative about a sin-
gle parameter (the probability that the target city will
sustain evacuation-warranting damage); thus, we define
f(cj , i) = 1(j = i). In the general case, the relevance
function is a design choice that affords an easy oppor-
tunity to imbue BMPS with domain knowledge. In the
simulations reported below, the relevance function asso-
ciates each c with the set of parameters that inform the
value of the actions (or, in the case of planning, options)
that c reasons about.
Critically, all three VOI features can be computed ef-
ficiently or can be efficiently approximated by Monte-
Carlo integration (Hammersley, 2013). BMPS thus ap-
proximates the VOC by a mixture of VOI features and an
estimate of the cost of future computations
(5)ˆVOC(c, b;w) = w1 · VOI1(c, b) + w2 · VPI(b)
+w3 ·VPIsub(c, b)−w4 · cost(c),
with the constraints that w1, w2, w3 ∈ [0, 1], w1 + w2 +
w3 = 1, and w4 ∈ [1, h] where h is an upper bound
on how many computations can be performed. Since
the VOC defines the optimal metalevel policy (Equa-
tion 1), we can define an approximately optimal policy,
pimeta(b;w) = argmaxc ˆVOC(c, b;w).
The parameters w of this policy are opti-
mized by maximizing the expected return
E [
∑
t rmeta(bt, pimeta(bt;w))], i.e. direct policy search.
Because there are only three free parameters with the
summation constraint, we propose using Bayesian
optimization (BO) (Mockus, 2012) to optimize the
weights in a sample efficient manner.
The novelty of BMPS lies in leveraging machine learn-
ing to approximate the solution to metalevel MDPs and
in the discovery of features that make this tractable. As
far as we know, BMPS is the first general approach to
metacognitive RL. In the following sections, we validate
the assumptions of BMPS, evaluate its performance on
increasingly complex metareasoning problems, compare
it to existing methods, and discuss potential applications.
4 EVALUATIONS OF BMPS
We evaluate how accurately BMPS can approxi-
mate rational metareasoning against two state-of-the-
art approximations—the meta-greedy policy and the
blinkered approximation—on three increasingly difficult
metareasoning problems.
4.1 WHEN TO STOP DELIBERATING?
How long should an agent deliberate before answering a
question? Our evaluation mimics this problem for a bi-
nary prediction task (e.g., “Will the price of the stock go
up or down?”). Every deliberation incurs a cost and pro-
vides probabilistic evidence Xt ∼ Bernoulli(θ) in favor
of one outcome or the other. At any point the agent can
stop deliberating and predict the outcome supported by
previous deliberations. The agent receives a reward of
+1 if its prediction is correct, or incurs a loss of −1 if it
is incorrect. The goal is to maximize the expected reward
of this one prediction minus the cost of computation.
4.1.1 Metalevel MDP
We formalize the problem of deciding when
to stop thinking as a metalevel MDP Mmeta =
(B,A, Tmeta, rmeta) where each belief state (α, β) ∈ B
defines a beta distribution over the probability θ of the
first outcome. The metalevel actions A are {c1,⊥}
where c1 refines the belief by sampling, and ⊥ termi-
nates deliberation and predicts the outcome that is most
likely according to the current belief. The transition
probabilities for sampling are defined by the agent’s be-
lief state, that is Tmeta((α, β), c1, (α+1, β)) = αα+β and
Tmeta((α, β), c1, (α, β+1)) =
β
α+β . The reward function
rmeta reflects the cost of computation, rmeta(b, c1) = −λ,
and the probability of making the correct prediction,
rmeta(b,⊥) = +1 · pcorrect(α, β)− 1 · (1− pcorrect(α, β)),
where pcorrect(α, β) = max{ αα+β , βα+β }). We set the
horizon to h = 30, meaning that the agent can perform
at most 29 computations before making a prediction (the
30th metalevel action must be ⊥).
Since there is only one parameter (θ has length one), the
VPIsub feature is identical with the VPI feature; thus, we
exclude it. For the same reason, the blinkered approxi-
mation is equivalent to solving the problem exactly, and
we exclude it from the comparison.
4.1.2 Evaluation procedure
We evaluated the potential of BMPS in two steps:
First, we performed a regression analysis to evaluate
whether the proposed features are sufficient to capture
the value of computation, computed exactly by back-
ward induction (Puterman, 2014). Second, we tested
whether a near-optimal metalevel policy can be learned
by Bayesian optimization of the weights of the metalevel
policy. We ran 500 iterations of optimization, estimating
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Figure 2: Results of performance evaluation on the prob-
lem of metareasoning about when to stop deliberating.
the expected return of the policy entailed by the probed
weight vector by its average return across 2500 episodes.
The performance of the learned policy was evaluated on
an independent test set of 3000 episodes.
4.1.3 Results
First, linear regression analyses confirmed that the three
features (VOI1(c, b), VPI(c, b), and cost(c)) are suffi-
cient to capture between 90.8% and 100.0% of the vari-
ance in the value of computation for performing a sim-
ulation (VOC(b, c1)) across different states b, depending
on the cost of computation.
Concretely, as the cost of computation increased from
0.001 to 0.1 the regression weights shifted from 0.76 ·
VPI + 0.46 · VOI1 − 4.5 · cost to 0.00 · VPI + 1.00 ·
VOI1 − 1.00 · cost and the explained variance increased
from 90.8% to 100.0%. The explained variance and the
weights remained the same for costs greater than 0.1.
Supplementary Figure 1 illustrates this fit for λ = 0.02.
Second, we found that the VOI1 and the VPI features
are sufficient to learn a near-optimal metalevel policy.
As shown in Figure 2, the performance of BMPS was
at most 5.19% lower than the performance of the opti-
mal metalevel policy across all costs. The difference in
performance was largest for the lowest cost λ = 0.001
(t(2999) = 3.75, p = 0.0002) and decreased with in-
creasing cost so that there was no statistically signifi-
cant performance difference between BMPS and the op-
timal metalevel policy for costs greater than λ = 0.0025
(all p > 0.15). BMPS performed between 6.78% and
35.8% better than the meta-greedy policy across all costs
where the optimal policy made more than one obser-
vation (all p < 0.0001) and 20.3% better on average
(t(44999) = 42.4, p < 10−15).
4.2 META-DECISION-MAKING
How should an agent allocate its limited decision-time
across estimating the expected utilities of multiple al-
ternatives? To evaluate how well BMPS can solve this
kind of problem, we evaluate it on the Bernoulli met-
alevel probability model introduced by Hay et al. (2012).
This problem is similar to the standard multi-armed ban-
dit problem with one critical difference: Only the re-
ward from the final pull counts—the previous ”simu-
lated” pulls provide information, but no reward. Like
the first problem, the agent takes a single object-level
action, choosing arm i and receiving reward r(s, ai) ∼
Bernoulli(θi). Unlike the first problem, however, the
agent must track multiple environment parameters and
select among competing computations.
4.2.1 Metalevel MDP
The Bernoulli metalevel probability model is a metalevel
MDP Mmeta = (B,A, Tmeta, rmeta, h) where each be-
lief state b defines k Beta distributions over the reward
probabilities θ1, · · · , θk of the k possible actions. Thus
b can be represented by ((α1, β1), . . . , (αk, βk)) where
b(θi) = Beta(θi;αi, βi). For the initial belief state b0,
these parameters are αi = βi = 1. The metalevel ac-
tions A are {c1, . . . , ck,⊥} where ci simulates action
ai and ⊥ terminates deliberation and executes the ac-
tion with the highest expected return. The metalevel
transition function Tmeta encodes that performing com-
putation ci increments αi with probability αiαi+βi and in-
crements βi with probability βiαi+βi . The metalevel re-
ward function rmeta(b, c) is −λ for c ∈ {c1, · · · , ck} and
rmeta(b,⊥) = maxi αiαi+βi . Finally, the horizon h is the
maximum number of metalevel actions that can be per-
formed and the last metalevel action must be ⊥.
4.2.2 Evaluation procedure
We evaluated BMPS on Bernoulli metalevel probabil-
ity problems with k ∈ {2, · · · , 5} object-level actions, a
horizon of h = 25, and computational costs ranging from
10−4 to 10−1. We compared the policy learned by BMPS
with the optimal metalevel policy and three alternative
approximations: the meta-greedy heuristic (Russell &
Wefald, 1991b), the blinkered approximation (Hay et al.,
2012), and the metalevel policy that always deliberates as
much as possible. In addition to these, we also trained a
Deep-Q-Network (DQN) (Mnih et al., 2015) on the met-
alevel MDP to compare the performance of our method
to baselines achieved by off-the-shelf deep RL methods
(Dhariwal et al., 2017).
We trained BMPS as described above, but with 10 iter-
ations of 1000 episodes each. To combat the possibil-
ity of overfitting, we evaluated the average returns of the
five best weight vectors over 5000 more episodes and se-
lected the one that performed best. The relevance func-
tion for VPIsub matches each computation with the single
parameter it is informative about, i.e., f(cj , i) = 1(j =
i). The optimal metalevel policy and the blinkered pol-
icy were computed using backward induction (Puterman,
2014). The DQN was trained for 5, 000, 000 steps. Since
the episodes have a horizon of h = 25, this resulted in
more than 200, 000 training episodes for the DQN. We
evaluated the performance of each policy by its average
return across 2000 test episodes for each combination of
computational cost and number of object-level actions.
4.2.3 Results
We found that the BMPS policy attained 99.1% of op-
timal performance (0.6535 vs. 0.6596, t(1998) =
−7.43, p < 0.0001) and significantly outperformed
the meta-greedy heuristic (0.60, t(1998) = 83.9, p <
10−15), the full-deliberation policy (0.20, t(1998) =
469.1, p < 10−15), and the DQN (0.58, t(1998) =
79.2, p < 10−15). The performance of BMPS (0.6535)
and the blinkered approximation (0.6559) differed by
only 0.37%.
Figure 3a shows the methods’ average performance as
a function of the cost of computation. BMPS outper-
formed the meta-greedy heuristic for costs smaller than
0.03 (all p < 10−15), the full-deliberation policy for
costs greater than 0.0003 (all p < 0.005), and the DQN
for all costs (all p < 10−15). For costs below 0.0003, the
blinkered policy performed slightly better than BMPS
(all p < 0.01). For all other costs both methods per-
formed at the same level (all p > 0.1). For costs above
0.01, performance of BMPS becomes indistinguishable
from the optimal policy’s performance (all p > 0.1).
Figure 3b shows the metareasoning performance of each
method as a function of the number of options. We found
that the performance of BMPS scaled well with the size
of the decision problem. For each number of options, the
relative performance of the different methods was con-
sistent with the results reported above.
Finally, as illustrated in Supplementary Figure 2, we
found that BMPS learned surprisingly quickly, usually
discovering near-optimal policies in less than 10 itera-
tions. In particular, BMPS was able to perform signif-
icantly better than the DQN, despite being trained on
fewer than 20% as many episodes. This demonstrates
the value of the proposed VOI features, which dramat-
ically constrain the space of possible metalevel policies
to be considered.
4.3 METAREASONING ABOUT PLANNING
Having evaluated BMPS on problems of metareasoning
about how to make a one-shot decision, we now evalu-
ate its performance at deciding how to plan. To do so,
we define the Bernoulli metalevel tree, which general-
izes the Bernoulli metalevel probability model by replac-
ing the one-shot decision between k options by a tree-
structured sequential decision problem that we will re-
fer to as the object-level MDP. The transitions of the
object-level MDP are deterministic and known to the
agent. The reward associated with each of k = 2h+1 − 1
states in the tree is deterministic, but initially unknown;
r(s, a, si) = θi ∈ {−1, 1}. The agent can uncover these
rewards through reasoning at a cost of −λ per reward.
When the agent terminates deliberation, it executes a pol-
icy with maximal expected utilty. Unlike in the previous
domains, this policy entails a sequence of actions rather
than a single action.
4.3.1 Metalevel MDP
The Bernoulli metalevel tree is a metalevel MDP
Mmeta = (B,A, Tmeta, rmeta) where each belief state b
encodes one Bernoulli distribution for each transition’s
reward. Thus, b can be represented as (p1, · · · , pi) such
that b(θi = 1) = pi and b(θi = −1) = 1 − pi. The
initial belief b0 has pi = 0.5 for all i. The metalevel
actions are defined A = {c1, · · · , ck,⊥} where ci re-
veals the reward at state si and ⊥ selects the path with
highest expected sum of rewards according to the cur-
rent belief state. The transition function Tmeta encodes
that performing computation ci sets pi to 1 or 0 with
equal probability (unless pi has already been updated, in
which case ci has no effect). The metalevel reward func-
tion is defined rmeta(b, c) = −λ for c ∈ {c1, · · · , ck},
and rmeta(b,⊥) = maxt∈T
∑
i∈tE[θi | pi] where T is
the set of possible trajectories t through the environment,
and E[θi | pi] = 2pi − 1 is the expected reward attained
at state si.
4.3.3 Evaluation procedure
We evaluated each method’s performance by its aver-
age return over 5000 episodes for each combination of
tree-height h ∈ {2, · · · , 6} and computational cost λ ∈
{2−7, · · · , 20}. To facilitate comparisons across plan-
ning problems with different numbers of steps, we mea-
sured the performance of metalevel policies by their ex-
pected return divided by the tree-height.
We trained the BMPS policy with 100 iterations of 1000
episodes each. To combat the possibility of overfit-
ting, we evaluated the average returns of the three best
weight vectors over 2000 more episodes and selected
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Figure 3: Metareasoning performance of alternative methods on the Bernoulli metalevel probability model (a) as a
function of the cost of computation and (b) as a function of the number of actions. Metareasoning performance is
defined as the expected reward for the chosen option minus the computational cost of the decision process. Error bars
enclose 95% confidence intervals.
the one that performed best. The relevance function
for VPIsub maps a computation to all the parameters
that affect the value of any policy that the initial com-
putation is informative about, i.e. f(cj , i) = 1(i ∈
{j} ∪ descendents(j) ∪ ancestors(j))
For metareasoning about how to plan in trees of height
2 and 3, we were able to compute the optimal met-
alevel policy using dynamic programming. But for larger
trees, computing the optimal metalevel policy would
have taken significantly longer than 6 hours and was
therefore not undertaken.
The blinkered policy of Hay et al. (2012) is not directly
applicable to planning because of its assumption of “in-
dependent actions” which is violated in the Bernoulli
metalevel tree. Briefly, the assumption is violated be-
cause the reward at a given state affects the value of mul-
tiple policies. Thus, we derived a recursive generaliza-
tion of the blinkered policy to compare with our method.
See the Supporting Materials for details.
4.3.4 Results
We first compared BMPS with the optimal policy for
h ∈ {2, 3}, finding that it attained 98.4% of op-
timal performance (0.367 vs. 0.373, t(159998) =
−2.87, p < 10−15). Metareasoning performance dif-
fered significantly across the four methods we evaluated
(F (3, 799840) = 4625010; p < 10−15), and the mag-
nitude of this effect depends on the height of the tree
(F (12, 799840) = 1110179, p < 10−15) and the cost of
computation (F (21, 799840) = 1266582, p < 10−15).
Across all heights and costs, BMPS achieved a metarea-
soning performance of 0.392 units of reward per object-
level action, thereby outperforming the meta-greedy
heuristic (0.307, t(399998) = 72.84, p < 10−15),
the recursively blinkered policy (0.368, t(399998) =
20.77, p < 10−15), and the full-deliberation policy
(−1.740, t(399998) = 231.18, p < 10−15).
As shown in Figure 4a, BMPS performed near-optimally
across all computational costs, and its advantage over the
meta-greedy heuristic and the tree-blinkered approxima-
tion was largest when the cost of computation was low,
whereas its benefit over the full-deliberation policy in-
creased with the cost of computation.
Figure 4b shows that the performance of BMPS scaled
very well with the size of the planning problem, and that
its advantage over the meta-greedy heuristic increased
with the height of the tree.
5 IS METAREASONING USEFUL?
The costs of metareasoning often outweigh the result-
ing improvements in object-level reasoning. But here we
show that the benefits of BMPS outweigh its costs in a
potential application to emergency management.
During severe weather, important decisions—such as
which cities to evacuate in the face of an approaching
tornado—must be based on a limited number of compu-
tationally intense weather simulations that estimate the
probability that a city will be severely hit (Baumgart,
Bass, Philips, & Kloesel, 2008). Based on these simu-
lations, an emergency manager makes evacuation deci-
sions so as to minimize the risk of false positive errors
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Figure 4: Metareasoning performance of alternative methods on the Bernoulli tree (a) as a function of computational
cost (with tree-height 3) and (b) as a function of the number of actions (marginalizing over computational costs
between 10−4 and 10−1). Metareasoning performance is normalized by tree height to facilitate comparison. In (b),
the optimal policy is only shown for heights at which it can be computed in under six hours and the full observation
policy is not shown because its performance is negative for all heights. Error bars enclose 95% confidence intervals.
(evacuating cities that are safe) and false negative errors
(failing to evacuate a city the tornado hits). We assume
that the manager has access to a single supercomputer,
but pays no cost for running each simulation. Thus, the
manager has a fixed budget of simulations and her goal
is to maximize the expected utility of the final decision.
5.1 METHODS
We model the above scenario as follows: There is a fi-
nite amount of time T until evacuation decisions about
k cities have to be made. For each city i, the emer-
gency manager can run a fine grained, stochastic simu-
lation (ci) of how it will be impacted by the approaching
tornado. Each simulation yields a binary outcome, in-
dicating whether the simulated impact would warrant an
evacuation or not. The belief state b and transition func-
tion Tmeta of the corresponding metalevel MDP are the
same as in the Bernoulli metalevel probability model:
Each belief state defines k Beta distributions that track
the probability that the tornado will cause evacuation-
warranting damage in each city. The parameters αi and
βi correspond to the number of simulations predicting
that the tornado {would — would not} be strong enough
to warrant an evacuation of city i. Prior to the first sim-
ulation, the parameters for each city i are initialized as
αi = 0.1 and βi = 0.9 to capture the prior knowledge
that evacuations are rarely necessary. The primary for-
mal difference from the Bernoulli metalevel probability
model lies in how the final belief state is translated into
a decision and reward. Rather than choosing a single
option, the agent must make k independent binary deci-
sions about whether to evacuate each city. Evacuation
has a cost, λevac = −1, but failing to evacuate a heavily-
hit city has a much larger cost, λfn = −20. Thus, the
metalevel reward function is
rmeta(b,⊥) =
∑
1≤i≤k
max
{
αi
αi + βi
· λfn, λevac
}
. (6)
In contrast to the previous simulations, we now explicitly
consider the cost of metareasoning. The decision time T
has to be allocated between reasoning about the cities
and metareasoning about which city to reason about so
that T = nsim · (tMR + tsim), where nsim is the number
of simulations run, tMR is the amount of time it takes to
choose one simulation to run (i.e. by metareasoning),
and tsim is the amount of time it takes to run one simula-
tion. Thus, for given values of tMR and tsim the number of
simulations that can be performed is nsim =
⌊
T
tMR+tsim
⌋
,
where bxc rounds x down to the closest integer. Note that
metalevel policy is computed offline, and thus training
time does not factor into the above equation. The simula-
tions reported below use a single BMPS policy optimized
for k = 20 and nsim = 50 to mimic the reuse of pre-
computed weights in practical applications; the weights
are relatively insensitive to these parameters.
To assess if BMPS could be useful in practice, we com-
pare the utility of evacuation decisions made by its met-
alevel policy to those made by a baseline metalevel pol-
icy that uniformly distributes simulations across the k
cities. Since the BMPS policy has tMR > 0 while the
baseline policy has tMR ≈ 0, BMPS will typically run
fewer simulations and must make up for this by choos-
ing more valuable ones.
5.2 RESULTS
We evaluated the BMPS policy and the uniform compu-
tation policy on the tornado problem with T = 24 hours,
k ∈ {10, 30} cities, and a range of plausible values for
the duration of each weather simulation (tsim ∈ [2−2, 24]
hours). For each policy and parameter setting we esti-
mate utility as the mean return over 5000 rollouts.
Empirically, we found that tMR ≈ 1 ms for k = 10 and
tMR ≈ 3 ms for k = 30. Thus, even with a conservative
estimate of tMR = 0.001 hours, metareasoning would
cost at most one simulation. Consequently, in our simu-
lations, diverting some of the computational resources to
metareasoning was advantageous regardless of how long
exactly a tornado simulation might take and the number
of cities being considered. As Figure 5 shows, the benefit
of metareasoning was larger for the more complex prob-
lem with more cities and peaked for an intermediate cost
of object-level reasoning.
While this is a hypothetical scenario, it suggests that
BMPS could be useful for practical applications. Specif-
ically, we suggest that the method will be most valu-
able when a metareasoning problem must be faced mul-
tiple times (so that the cost of training BMPS offline can
be amortized) and object-level computations are expen-
sive (so that the resulting savings in object-level reason-
ing outweigh the online cost of computing the features
used for metareasoning). In follow-up simulations, we
explored conditions in which the cost of metareasoning
causes a substantial reduction in the number of simula-
tions that can be run. We found that metareasoning con-
tinues to be useful as long as object-level computation
is substantially more expensive than metareasoning (see
Supplementary Material).
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6 DISCUSSION
We have introduced a new approach to solving the foun-
dational problem of rational metareasoning: metacogni-
tive reinforcement learning. This approach applies algo-
rithms from RL to metalevel MDPs to learn a policy for
selecting computations. Our results show that BMPS can
outperform the state of the art for approximate metarea-
soning. While we illustrated this approach using a policy
search algorithm based on Bayesian optimization, there
are many other RL algorithms that could be used instead,
including policy gradient algorithms, actor-critic meth-
ods, and temporal difference learning with function ap-
proximation.
Since BMPS approximates the value of computation as a
mixture of the myopic VOI and two other VOI features,
it can be seen as a generalization of the meta-greedy ap-
proximation (Lin et al., 2015; Russell & Wefald, 1991a).
It is the combination of these features with RL that makes
BMPS tractable and powerful. BMPS works well across
a wider range of problems than previous approximations
because it reduces arbitrarily complex metalevel MDPs
to low-dimensional optimization problems. We predict
that metacognitive RL will enable significant advances
in artificial intelligence and its applications. In the long
view, metacognitive RL may become a foundation for
self-improving AI systems that learn how to solve in-
creasingly complex problems with increasing efficiency.
One weakness of our approach is that the time required
to compute the value of perfect information by exact in-
tegration increases exponentially with the number of pa-
rameters in the agent’s model of the environment. Thus,
an important direction for future work is developing
efficient approximations or alternatives to this feature,
and/or discovering new features via deep RL (Mnih et
al., 2015). A second limitation is our assumption that the
meta-reasoner has an exact model of its own computa-
tional architecture in the form of a metalevel MDP. This
motivates the incorporation of model-learning mecha-
nisms into a metacognitive RL algorithm.
We have shown that the benefits of metareasoning with
our method already more than outweigh its computa-
tional costs in scenarios where the object-level computa-
tions are very expensive. It might therefore benefit prac-
tical applications that involve complex large-scale simu-
lations, active learning problems, hyperparameter search,
and the optimization of functions that are very expensive
to evaluate. Finally, BMPS could also be applied to de-
rive rational process models of human cognition.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
THE RECURSIVELY BLINKERED POLICY
The blinkered policy of Hay et al. (2012) was defined
for problems where each computation informs the value
of only one action. This assumption of “independent
actions” is crucial to the efficiency of the blinkered ap-
proximation because it allows the problem to be decom-
posed into independent (and easily solved) subproblems
for each action. However, the assumption does not hold
for the Bernoulli metalevel tree because the reward at a
given state affects the value of multiple policies. This
is because in the context of sequential decision mak-
ing, “actions” become policies, and the reward at one
state affects the values of all policies visiting that state.
Thus, a single computation affects the value of many
policies. An intuitive generalization would be to approx-
imate the value of a computation c by assuming that fu-
ture computations will be limited to those that are in-
formative about any of the policies the initial compu-
tation is relevant to, a set we call Ec,. However, for
large trees, this only modestly reduces the size of the ini-
tial problem. This suggests a recursive generalization:
Rather than applying the blinkered approximation once
and solving the resulting subproblem exactly, we recur-
sively apply the approximation to the resulting subprob-
lems. Finally, to ensure that the subproblems decrease
in size monotonically, we remove from Ec the compu-
tations about rewards on the path from the agent’s cur-
rent state to the state inspected by computation c and
call the resulting set E ′c. Thus, we define the recursively
blinkered policy as piRB(b) = argmaxcQRB(b, c) with
QRB(bt,⊥) = rmeta(bt,⊥) and QRBmeta(b, c) =
rmeta(b, c) + EB′∼Tmeta(b,c,·)
[
max
c′∈E′
c′
QRB(B′, c′)
]
DETAILS ON SIMULATIONS REPORTED IN
SECTION 5
We found the computational cost of metareasoning for
the tornado problem to be several orders of magnitude
lower than realistic costs of object-level computations
(i.e. weather simulations). Thus, the simulations leave
open the question of whether BMPS can also be usefully
applied when metareasoning costs are non-negligible. To
answer this question, we ran additional simulations for
the tornado problem with unrealistically low values of T
and tsim.
The simulations summarized in Figure 6 investigated hy-
pothetical scenarios where the metareasoning cost in-
curred by the BMPS policy considerably reduces the
amount of object-level computation it can perform. This
reduction is greatest when object-level computations are
fast and the total amount of available time T is high.
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 7, BMPS still often out-
performs allocating computation time uniformly. This
is often true even when BMPS can perform only half as
many simulations (e.g. T = 0.03; k = 30; tsim = 2−10).
As expected, when the time to run a simulation is much
less than the time to metareason about which simulation
to run, metareasoning does not pay off anymore. Overall,
we see that the benefit of metareasoning increases with
the costliness of object-level reasoning and the number
of computations that must be considered, but decreases
with increased total computation time.
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Figure 6: The number of simulations that can be run with
versus without metareasoning as a function of the total
time T and the cost of each simulation tsim.
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Figure 7: Utility of BMPS vs. allocating computation
uniformly as a function of the total time T , the cost of
each simulation tsim, and the number of possible compu-
tations (i.e. the number of cities) k.
Mmeta meta-level Markov Decision Process
B Set of possible belief states
A Set of meta-level actions C,∪{⊥}
C set of possible computations
⊥ meta-level action that terminates deliberation and initiates an object-
level action
rmeta(b, c) reward function of the meta-level MDP, rmeta(b, c) = −cost(c) = −λ
for c ∈ C and rmeta(b,⊥) = maxpi Eθ∼b[Upi(θ)]
λ cost of a single computation
Tmeta(b, c, b
′) probability that performing computation c in belief state b leads to be-
lief state b′
θ parameters of the agent’s model of the environment
pi object-level policy for selecting physical actions
Upi(θ) expected return of acting according to the object-level policy pi if θ is
the correct model of the environment
U(b) expected value of terminating computation with the belief b, rmeta(b,⊥)
pimeta meta-level policy for selecting computational actions
pi?meta optimal meta-level policy, see Equation 1
VOC(c, b) Value of Computation, the expected improvement in decision quality
that can be achieved by performing computation c in belief state b and
continuing optimally, minus the cost of the optimal sequence of com-
putations
VOI1(c, b) myopic Value of Information, expected improvement in decision qual-
ity from taking a single computation c before terminating computation,
see Equation 2
VPI(b) Value of Perfect Information, the expected improvement in decision
quality from attaining a maximally informed belief state beginning in
belief state b, see Equation 3
VPIsub(c, b) value of attaining perfect information about the subset of components
of θ that are most relevant to computation c, see Equation 4
Table 1: Mathematical notation
